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Introduction 
In this article, I will try to analyze —focusing on the profiles of  the top 
management— the complex interaction between industrial strategies, political 
constraints and business cycle that turned the identity of  IRI (Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale — Institute for Industrial Reconstruction) compa-
nies into agencies for Italy’s economic development over the period 1933-1970. 
Economists and historians have given divergent assessments about the 
origins and the first decades of  activity of  IRI: Andrew Shonfield, in his well-
known comparison of  various forms of  national capitalism, expressed a neg-
ative verdict, considering IRI the result of  haphazard events rather than a 
series of  well-devised political and economic choices1. On the opposite front, 
other scholars, including Stuart Holland and Pasquale Saraceno, emphasized 
the role of  state holdings in leading firms to ensure long-term innovative in-
vestment, to extend the national innovation frontier and to offset negative ex-
ternalities. Holland especially described IRI as being “as efficient and dynam-
ic as private enterprise groups”2. 
* The article is inspired from the results of  a common reflection carried out together 
with Franco Amatori, whom I thank very much for having encouraged me to pursue this re-
search.
1. Shonfield (1965), pp. 178-179. 
2. Holland (1972), pp. 61-62; P. Saraceno, Bozza di un progetto di ricerca relativo alla 
“Storia di sessant’anni (gennaio 1933-dicembre 1992) di vita dell’Iri”, 1990, Pasquale Saraceno 
Historical Archive, f. 81. On the role of  managers in fostering innovation: Acemoglu, Aghion, 
Zilibotti (2006).
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Such divergent assessments have encouraged me to reconsider the intellec-
tual consistency of  the IRI project as well as the managerial competences of 
the group that created the concern and guided it through the difficult period 
of  the thirties, the tragic years of  World War II and the post-war reconstruc-
tion up to the “economic miracle”. 
As I will briefly explain in section “The origins of  IRI...”, in 1933, the 
Italian government decided to set up IRI, in order to deal with the effects of 
the 1929 crisis. The Institute took over the industrial holdings that the three 
major Italian universal banks controlled in strategic sectors such as steel, en-
gineering, telecommunications, shipbuilding and maritime transport. IRI was 
not a representative fascist body nor did it come forth with the intention of 
nationalizing the economy; notwithstanding its state ownership, the manage-
ment style resembled that of  private concerns and the new concern showed a 
strong element of  rationalization. The Group was designed on three levels: 
IRI was the super-holding, under it there were the sectorial financial holdings 
(at least 51% owned by IRI), and, at the bottom of the pyramid, the multi-
tude of  companies subject to the civil code as if  they were private firms. The 
governance of  the Group had to be entrusted to the best entrepreneurs and 
managers available; for this reason IRI invested greatly both in recruitment 
and in training: at least two generations of  Italian “technocracy” were em-
ployed within the Institute, an essential element outlined in section “Driving 
innovation...”. 
Because of  this combination of  industrial relevance, professional reputa-
tion and a vast network of relations in the industrial and financial milieu, at the 
end of  World War II, IRI managerial staff  were largely able to overcome 
the political and economic transition from fascism to parliamentary republic. 
In the 1950s, IRI became one of the main actors of Italy’s “economic miracle”: 
its companies were big businesses just as capable of  acting in the marketplace 
as their private counterparts (and, in some cases, even better; take, for instance, 
the steel industry). Some of them played a crucial role in infrastructural net-
works and acted as front-runners of technological and organizational innova-
tion. In sections “The postwar success...” and “Telecommunication...”, I will 
exactly exemplify choices and results of  management over the most success-
ful period in the history of  the Group.
As pointed out in section “The turning point...”, at the end of  the fifties, 
all of  this started to change when the “benign neglect” phase by the political 
system ended3. Leaders of  the government coalitions changed their attitude 
towards SOEs, making more and more use of  IRI to overcome the historical 
backwardness of  the Italian economy, especially in the Southern regions. De-
velopmental tasks assigned by the State as shareholder were interwoven with 
3. Barca (1997), p. 194.
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an increasing interference in SOEs by political parties, the interface of  Ital-
ian corporate society4. Politicians aimed to create jobs with little concern for 
the economic implications. By the end of  the sixties, IRI resembled more an 
agency for economic development than a system of enterprises struggling in 
the market. 
The entire IRI venture from its foundation (1933) to the end of  the “gold-
en age” (1970) can be seen through the biographies of  100 top managers of 
the holding, its sub-holdings and the most important companies. Using ma-
terials available in the huge historical archive of  the Institute as well as other 
reference sources, I have built a database concerning education, recruitment, 
careers, political positions, industrial choices of  an important management 
team acting over four crucial decades of  the Italian economy5. 
In this paper, I will describe only some of those managers, whose profiles 
and whose stories could be considered particularly significant in order to un-
derstand the most relevant experience of  managerial capitalism in over half  
a century of  Italian business history. Their characteristics may help to ana-
lyze the problematic identity of  the public managers, engaged in the difficult 
task of  combining the principles of  healthy corporate management with the 
goals of  economic and social development assigned to their companies. 
The origins of IRI: between emergency and strategy
IRI came out of  a devastating crisis, the one that started on Wall Street 
in October 1929 and hit Italy, a semi-peripheral country, in the second half  
of  1930. Even with this delay, in Italy the crisis was not less severe than in 
other industrial countries. It provoked the collapse of  the currency, a striking 
reduction of  real GDP (calculated in euros, from 228 to 132 millions), the 
bankruptcy of  almost 500 joint-stock companies (60% of the total), a mas-
sive increase of  industrial unemployment (more than 50% in 1929-1933)6. 
And it especially challenged the fragile relationship between major universal 
banks and big industrial firms, resulting from the efforts made by Italian in-
dustry during WWI and the postwar industrial restructuring. After the crisis, 
that symbiotic tie created serious problems for the Bank of Italy —last-resort 
4. Cox, O‘Sullivan (1988). 
5. This article contains very few references to the original sources, for which we refer to 
the database, which is partly available in Repertorio biografico del gruppo dirigente dell’IRI, 
edited by D. Felisini, I. Mandolesi, F. Salsano, in F. Amatori (ed.), Storia dell’IRI - 2. Il «mi-
racolo» economico e il ruolo dell’IRI, ebook Laterza, 2013 
http://www.laterza.it/index.php?option=com_laterza&Itemid=97&task=schedalibro&is
bn=9788858106853.
6. Ciocca, Toniolo (1984) pp. 113-136. Zamagni (1994), p. 359; Ferri, Garofalo (1994), 
pp. 112-113.
15089 Historia industrial 54.indd   83 12/02/14   17:50
Between State and Market. Managerial Capitalism Italian Style: IRI, 1933-1970 
84
lender for the national financial system— that risked being swept away. This 
would have been a catastrophe, which even a dictatorial regime like Fascism 
couldn’t afford.
On this basis, in 1933 the Italian government adopted the project of  Al-
berto Beneduce and created IRI as a temporary agency to restore the univer-
sal banks that came under its control (Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito 
Italiano, and Banco di Roma) taking over their industrial holdings and in this 
way severing the ties between banks and industrial corporations7. At the be-
ginning, IRI was divided into two sections: one focused on financing while 
the other focused on disinvesting: a process that today would be called “pri-
vatizations”, consisting of  putting the companies back on the path to finan-
cial health and then returning them to the market. But that action turned out 
not to be effectively viable, because Italy lacked both capital as well as the in-
dependent entrepreneurial and managerial resources required to invest in and 
restore industries in the key sectors (Table 1)8. 
TABLE 1 ▪ IRI production share in % of italian industries - 1937
90% of military iron and steel sector (Terni, Ansaldo, Cogne)
40% of civil iron and steel sector
80% of shipbuilding
30% of electric industry
25% of engineering
35% of chemical industry (including synthetic fibers)
15% of cotton industry
over 30% of the banking sector (Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, Banco di Roma)
In 1937, in accordance with the needs of  the autarchic policy of  Fascism, 
IRI was transformed into a permanent institution. Nevertheless, the Institute 
was not a fascist entity, embedded in the corporatist doctrine or linked with 
the fascist party; it was rather part of  the so-called “parallel bureaucracies”. 
Since the end of  the 19th century, in fact, special government economic initia-
tives had been taken out of  the State bureaucracy and put into the hands of 
entrepreneurial technicians and managers appointed by the government.
Alberto Beneduce (1877-1944), the founder of  IRI, was the epitome of 
this sort of  “escape from the State”9. For many years, Beneduce had worked 
7. “Studio sui problemi del risanamento bancario”, Relazione presentata dall’IRI al capo 
del Governo Benito Mussolini, 5 .12.1933, in Bank of  Italy Historical Archives, Direttorio-
Einaudi, 71.
8. Saraceno (1986), pp. 11-19.
9. Cassese (1974), Melis (2010).
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with Francesco Saverio Nitti, an economist and politician who served as Min-
ister of  the Economy in pre-Fascist Italy. Nitti was convinced that the only 
way to overcome Italian backwardness —and thus build a cohesive and mod-
ern Italian nation10— was via a rapid industrialization process based on the 
widespread use of  energy coming from the new electric industry. In this proc-
ess, the State played an important role, especially from a financial perspective. 
Beneduce shared this vision and dedicated most of  his intellectual energies as 
a public official to the problem of procuring funding for long-term industrial 
projects. In the early twenties, his efforts brought about the creation of  Cre-
diop (Consorzio di credito per le opere pubbliche; Consortium of credit for 
public works) and Icipu (Istituto di credito per le opere di pubblica utilità; In-
stitute of  credit for projects of  public utility)11. With the advent of  Fascism, 
he adopted a stance different from that of  Nitti. While the latter opted to 
abandon Italy and go into exile, Beneduce initially kept himself  out of  the 
fray, but starting in 1925, slowly reached out to Mussolini, ultimately becom-
ing his most influential economic advisor12. 
As has already been said, after the Great Depression, Mussolini himself  
gave Beneduce full operative powers for the realization of  the “IRI Opera-
tion”. The initiative was based on some guiding principles, which can be found 
in the IRI project of  1933 as well as in the 1936 reform of the credit system. 
The new banking law, in fact, was drafted by Beneduce together with his most 
important collaborator, Donato Menichella (1896-1984), director general of 
IRI from 1934 to 1944, who later became, in the post-war period, Governor 
of  the Bank of  Italy (1948-1960)13. By drastically separating banks from in-
dustry, the State took on full financial responsibilities as main shareholders 
after the huge bailout carried out to cope with the crisis14. 
At the same time, IRI had to manage companies belonging to the core 
sectors in a country that wanted to develop its industrial system, but visibly 
lacked a sufficient number of  capable private capitalists. Beneduce foresaw an 
industrial rationalization based on well-defined sectors. This was especially 
innovative in an era when the Italian economic structure was primarily char-
acterized by confusing multi-sectorial groups, built on the basis of  the share-
holdings of  the various banks. Firms in the same sector were now brought 
together under financial sectorial holdings, which established coordinated 
plans, allowing the firms to independently define their activities with the aim 
of being able to compete in the marketplace. Prior to the war, there were three 
holdings: Stet (1934) for telecommunications; Finmare (1936) for maritime 
10. Gentile (2011), pp. 96-102. 
11. Asso, De Cecco (1994). 
12. Franzinelli, Magnani, (2009), pp. 187-238.
13. Gigliobianco (2006), pp. 217-249.
14. D’Antone (2012), pp. 167-186.
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activities; and Finsider (1937) for steel —all of  which were controlled by IRI 
with a share of at least 51%, but were open to the participation of private cap-
ital. IRI, wholly owned by the State, acted as a super-holding and exercised 
the role of  setting out the basic strategic direction15. 
In order to enforce such a complex architecture, the best entrepreneurial 
and managerial human resources had to be mobilized. 
Driving innovation: a national technocracy
The strong point of  Beneduce’s plan was to employ the most talented 
managers, capable of  dealing with both financial as well as industrial aspects. 
In his vision, since private capitalism had failed, not only because of  its lack 
of  capital, but also because of  weak strategy and organization, the new State-
owned companies had to be put in “the best hands possible”, enhanced by 
the new organizational and managerial style that IRI aimed to introduce. 
As Keynes commented in the thirties, to cope with the crisis it was impor-
tant to pick out new managerial figures16. Working together with Menichella, 
Beneduce “created from nothing IRI’s top management ranks”17, by recruit-
ing scientists from research labs as well as skilled managers and technicians 
from private companies in strategic sectors (like electricity and steel). At the 
same time, Beneduce organized training programs for top and middle man-
agers; opening the 1938 course, he welcomed the interns with this speech: 
It doesn’t matter if  the activities you carry out will lead you to companies that are 
not controlled by IRI. IRI’s goal is to train a selected managing class that knows 
that not everything is experience or intuition, but that the industrial manager must 
also largely rely on technique and science.18
It was in these very firms of  IRI that the first nucleus of  an Italian “tech-
nocracy”19 grew, which not only fostered strong elements of  innovation in the 
spirit of  the public sector, but also revealed prominent attributes of  entrepre-
neurship, as confirmed by the professional biographies of  men like Giuseppe 
Cenzato, Ugo Bordoni, Agostino Rocca and Oscar Sinigaglia.
Giuseppe Cenzato (1882-1969) received a degree in electrical engineering 
from the University of  Milan before starting his professional apprenticeship 
in companies that manufactured electric machinery, including Brown Boveri. 
15. Amatori (2000), pp. 138-142.
16. Skidelski (1979).
17. Menichella (1997), p. 850.
18. Beneduce speech in Historical Archives of IRI, ID/1,1 ex 2 (translated by the Author).
19. Salsano (1987). 
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In 1919, he was named a director of  SME (Società Meridionale di Elettric-
ità), the major electric company in southern Italy and nine years later he was 
promoted to Chief  Executive Officer of  the same. Under his management, 
SME acquired an almost monopolistic position in Southern Italy. Beneduce 
sat on the board of  SME and had an opportunity to know and appreciate 
Cenzato’s skills as a manager and his technical abilities, including his talent 
in recruiting and training highly skilled technicians. Cenzato, too, gave spe-
cial importance to training programs: in 1932, based on a model of  what was 
taking place in Milan, Cenzato was among the promoters of  the creation of 
the “Fondazione Politecnica del Mezzogiorno” inside the engineering school 
of the University of Naples. Among the talented individuals who worked with 
the Foundation were the entrepreneur Nicola Romeo and the researcher 
Francesco Giordani, a chemist well known in Europe who would become 
President of  IRI (1939-43) and years later one of  the three experts entrust-
ed with designing the Euratom project. Until the fifties, SME was often the 
source of  some of IRI’s most talented managers.
Another scholar much sought after by industry was Ugo Bordoni (1884-
1952). After receiving his degree in electro-technical engineering (1906), he 
undertook some pioneering research in physics that received international 
recognition. He taught at the University of  Rome for almost four decades. An 
official in the engineering corps during the First World War, Bordoni went on 
to serve as a member of  the Committee for industrial mobilization. At the 
time of  IRI’s creation, Beneduce asked him to serve as a consultant on tele-
communications, analyzing the situation of  Italy’s telephone network and 
outlining some possible future prospects for its development. In Novem-
ber 1933, Beneduce offered Bordoni the presidency of  Stet, the first financial 
holding in the telephone sector; Bordoni accepted with some hesitation, and 
only the argument for public service was able to overcome his devotion to ac-
ademic research20. He was given the mandate to reorganize Stet both techno-
logically as well as financially; the first important measure was the sale of  a 
significant quantity of bonds to increase the company’s working capital. When 
the first issue closed, 42% was in the hands of  private investors, and Stet rep-
resented the first remarkable mix of co-shareholdings between public and pri-
vate investors.
Agostino Rocca (1895-1878), volunteered to serve in World War I and was 
an early adherent to the new Fascist movement. In 1921, he received a degree 
in industrial engineering from Milan Polytechnic; two years later he was em-
ployed as an apprentice engineer by Dalmine (a metallurgic unit controlled 
by Banca Commerciale Italiana) where he would subsequently become direc-
20. Letter of  Beneduce to Bordoni, 6 November 1933, in IRI Historical Archives, “Cor-
rispondenza riservatissima e personale di S.E. il Presidente”, PV001.
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tor of  laminations with responsibility for the technical-industrial plans and 
international relations. In the thirties, Rocca acted as a trustee of  Sofindit, 
the financial holding of  Banca Commerciale Italiana, and he was involved 
in the reorganization of  a number of  firms including SIP and Unes (electric 
power), Mira Lanza (soaps), and Silurificio italiano (torpedos). These expe-
riences fostered in him a work style based on financial rigor and technical-
strategic rationalization21; in 1933, Rocca joined IRI, entrusted with ration-
alizing the production lines of  Ansaldo, Cogne and Terni. In 1935, he was 
appointed CEO of  Ansaldo (heavy machinery and shipyards) where he un-
dertook an important restructuring of  the company’s technical-productive 
and organizational activities. Three years later, he was appointed Managing 
Director of  Finsider, IRI’s newly created financial holding in the steel sector. 
As such, Rocca took over the plan of  Oscar Sinigaglia —the prophet of  steel 
mass production— and built the continuous cycle plant of  Cornigliano 1 
(Genoa); completed in 1942, the plant was dismantled by the German army, 
who transported it back to their country.
Here, I mean to put the accent on the economic culture and on the organ-
izational and technical skills of  Agostino Rocca. These elements brought him 
to introduce a technical-scientific control in order to achieve a rationalization 
of the processes of manufacturing, and to assemble a cohort of managers and 
technicians with different professional experiences and political orientations. 
Rocca laid out the foundations of  a technocracy in the steel sector that would 
be definitely positive for State industries, even if, in those years, they were con-
strained by the Fascist regime’s priorities22. 
These three profiles suggest one of the fundamental questions in our anal-
ysis: what were the values and the cultures that unified the first cohort of  IRI 
managers and formed the basis of  a new management style, inspiring also the 
following generation? 
As a crucial element, we have to consider a fervent patriotism, a heritage 
from the Risorgimento (the movement that brought about the nation’s polit-
ical unification in the 1860s) that inspired several generations of Italian ruling 
classes, albeit with different ideal perspectives. Those patriotic feelings were 
forged during the dramatic years of  World War I, a deep experience shared 
by a large number of  those men: the research revealed that 70% of the first 
generation volunteered and 50% had distinguished service. 
The war —marked by State intervention in industrial production all over 
Europe— left a lasting legacy in the mentality of  the social groups who par-
ticipated. IRI managers shared the paradigm of national economic modern-
ization, a process in which the State must play a primary role. In no other 
21. Amatori, (2002), pp. 593-594; Ricciardi, (1998). 
22. Rugafiori (1984), pp. 392-395; Wengenroth (1985). 
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field, except in State-owned enterprises, was it possible to achieve a true merg-
er between national development vision and professional careers23. 
Their economic and managerial culture was visibly not a product of  the 
corporatist doctrine of Fascism; instead, it contains elements close to the tech-
nocratic and managerial experiences diffused in other countries, from Ger-
many to the United States, where it was empowered after the great crisis 
of  192924. As research has revealed, these individuals were outstandingly pre-
pared from a technical point of  view. Sampling from the database: in the first 
generation (born between 1880 and 1910) almost 50% had a degree (MA) in 
engineering, some of  them with very advanced skills expressed by scientific 
research results appreciated in Italy and abroad. A high percentage of  those 
“engineers in the boardroom” had a double competence, technical and finan-
cial. Several members of the whole sample had studied in top business schools 
and only 3 out of  the total did not have a university degree. Their competenc-
es were considered one of  the distinguishing elements of  IRI in comparison 
with other public sector institutions created during the Fascist period and the 
guarantee for the private company model of  business of  the Institute.
The postwar success of the “Beneduce system”: steel...
At the end of  World War II, Donato Menichella successfully convinced 
the American occupying forces that the “Beneduce system” offered numerous 
points of  strength, one of  them being the special competences of  the man-
agement group itself. It was the professional reputation of  those managers, 
combined with their vast network of  relationships —highlighted thanks to 
the information collected in the database— that allowed them to master the 
intricate transition from the downfall of  Fascism to the arrival of  the Allies 
and the postwar reconstruction. And that allowed IRI itself  to survive after 
the war, pending a better defined government project and given the impossi-
bility of  privatizing the firms controlled. As we will see, IRI would be able to 
successfully navigate Italy’s delicate political-institutional transformation, 
showing its best results during the nation’s so-called “economic miracle”. 
SOEs supported the domestic components of  Italian economic growth, cru-
cial in the first half  of  the fifties. Their contribution was enhanced in the fol-
lowing years: in terms of  gross fixed capital formation, investments by SOEs 
represented 8.7% in 1953 and 12.4% in 1962, while the percentage of  indus-
trial investments rose from 17.4% to 26.5% of the total in the same period25. 
23. Petri (1996), p. 263. 
24. Berle, Means (1932): Burnham (1941); Chandler (1977); Akin (1977).
25. Posner, Woolf  (1967), pp. 150-155.
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IRI made a significant contribution to the relevant national industrial growth 
(8.6% annual rate estimated by Carreras) and played a front-line role in na-
tional plans for innovation in manufacturing and in infrastructures26. 
During post-war reconstruction, IRI looked like a giant conglomerate: it 
was given a new Statute and established new sector holdings (in 1948 Finmec-
canica and in 1952 Finlettrica), but in many cases the links between sectors 
were loose. Big groups of  this type are a reality of  our times; they can be 
found in both advanced economies as well as in those countries that are try-
ing to reduce the gap that separates them from the major industrialized na-
tions. In the postwar years, the most important typologies of  this kind of 
group were the American conglomerate and Japan’s keiretsu. They differed 
because of  the type of  control exercised by top management. In the case of 
US conglomerates, the headquarters established corporate policies and allo-
cated resources among the various firms, basing its choices on the firms’ short 
term financial results; the system was known as management by numbers. In 
the horizontal Japanese groups, instead, individual firms were highly auton-
omous. Each company made its own decisions regarding markets, invest-
ments, and time horizons. The keiretsu headquarter was little more than a se-
ries of  meetings (usually monthly) between presidents of  the largest firms in 
the group; the hub of  the keiretsu was the so-called “main bank” which as-
sured continuity in shareholder equilibrium and, as a result, could guarantee 
a certain form of  management stability. The choice of  the conglomerate to 
separate top from middle and lower management (where those managers 
faced the battles of  the marketplace each day) was one of  the weaknesses 
of  American big business whereas the keiretsu became a cornerstone of  Jap-
anese success27. 
From this comparison, it could be inferred that to be successful, a large, 
highly diversified group needed to grant a large amount of  autonomy to the 
individuals heading the single firms that made up the group. This had been 
the original approach of  Beneduce and Menichella, lasting till the fifties, as 
remembered in his autobiography by Gian Lupo Osti, one of the most impor-
tant managers in the public steel sector in the fifties and sixties28. In the fifties, 
management teams of  the single firms had wide margins of  autonomy. The 
headquarters acted mainly as a financial guarantor both towards the govern-
ment and the capital market and credit institutions, at national and interna-
tional level. This allowed IRI access to the resources needed to implement the 
important industrial initiatives undertaken at that time: the continuous cycle 
steel plants, the development of  telecommunication systems, the construction 
26. Carreras (1999), p. 193.
27. Chandler (1994), Fruin (1991). 
28. Osti (1993), p. 115.
15089 Historia industrial 54.indd   90 12/02/14   17:50
Daniela Felisini 
91
of toll roads, and the manufacture of  automobiles like the Alfa Romeo Giu-
lietta which came to symbolize the “dolce vita”. 
A notable protagonist of  this era was a man of the first generation of  IRI 
management, Oscar Sinigaglia (1877-1953). Trained as an engineer, experienced 
in his family enterprise, he was an excellent example of  the deep-rooted na-
tional spirit shared by Italian entrepreneurs and managers I have already re-
ferred to. He was a courageous volunteer in World War I, a member of  the 
Italy’s irredentism movement that worked to bring about the integration in 
the newly unified Italy of  those borderline territories that had been omitted 
from the unification settlement, and a supporter of  the first fascist movement 
because of  its nationalistic tendencies. In 1948 Sinigaglia gave a significant 
speech at a meeting organized in Rome by the Christian Democrats entitled 
“Rifare l’Italia” (“Remaking Italy”). 
Like Beneduce, he was convinced that a market economy was much more 
efficient than a State controlled one. Still, he believed that if  private enterprise 
showed itself  to be unable to resolve the problem that lay at the root of  Ital-
ian industry (that of the future of steel), then it was right that the State should 
intervene and take over the role of  entrepreneur. President of  Ilva in 1933-34, 
he had proposed a Plan for developing Italy’s steel industry; but it was only 
in the postwar period —when Sinagaglia was named President of  Finsider— 
that his Plan actually came to fruition, with the contribution of  the manage-
rial cohort organized by Sinigaglia. The Plan was based on building a new in-
tegral cycle plant in Cornigliano and making the other plants located on the 
Tyrrhenian Sea specialized in railway tracks (Piombino) and steel for ship-
building (Bagnoli). 
With his tenacity, Sinigaglia was not only able to continue the project 
—while adapting it to the country’s new international stance— but also to 
overcome the resistance of  private steel firms as well as securing the support 
of Fiat, with whom an agreement was reached for the sale of a major portion of 
the laminated steel produced in the Cornigliano plant. Approved by the Ital-
ian government in 1948, the project benefited from the funds of  the Marshall 
Plan used for restructuring plants; further impetus would be received start-
ing in 1951, when the participation to the new European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) allowed Italy to get raw materials at reduced costs. The result 
was a significant increase in manufacturing capacity that meant lower costs 
for steel, enabling Italy’s steel industry to produce at international standards. 
Between 1950 and 1955, Italy achieved significant increases: from 1.3 to 2% 
of  world steel production and from 5 to 7.5% of  the EEC. This was based 
on substantial productivity gains: from 47.8 tons per employee in 1954 to 63.7 
in 195629. 
29. Ranieri (1984). 
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TABLE 2 ▪ Finsider output in % of total 
italian output
1952 1957
Iron 66 82
Steel 44 51
Hot-rolled 43 55
Pig iron 58 82
Source: Balconi (1991), p. 97
This ability to compete internationally, at least in some sectors, was a 
remarkable element that differentiated the experience of  IRI from that of 
other European SOEs. For example, Spain’s INI (Instituto National de In-
dustria) was established in 1941 on the model of  IRI in order to promote 
the development of  industry and the self-sufficiency of  the Spanish econ-
omy. As IRI, the natural fields of  action were the heavy industries: electric-
ity, steel, heavy engineering, shipbuilding, petroleum, chemicals, but also 
infrastructures (telecommunications and transport). INI was particularly 
dynamic between 1945 and 1951, when its founder and first President Juan 
Antonio Suanzes (1941-1963) also served as Minister of  Industry. Suanz-
es, a nautical engineer trained at Vickers, was very close to Franco and was 
convinced of  the need for Spain to get rid of  foreign interests. Although 
active in sectors suited to exploit the economies of  scale, INI companies were 
concentrated on the domestic market and were afflicted with dwarfism; es-
sential functions, such as marketing and R & D, were backward. In 1962, 
while the outputs and profits of  INI companies were at the highest level in 
the national economy, none of  them appeared in the list of  top 500 in the 
world30. 
Telecommunications, toll roads, cars
In the postwar period, Guglielmo Reiss Romoli (1895-1961) served as lead-
er of  the telephone sector. Born in Trieste when the city was still part of  the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, he was an active member of  the Italy’s irredent-
ism movement and later volunteered to fight with the Italian Army in World 
War I. Reiss Romoli was a manager at Banca Commerciale Italiana when in 
the Thirties he took part in the reorganization of  some of the telephone con-
30. Martin Acena, Comin (1991);. San Roman Lopez (1999); Catalan, (1995) and (2002); 
Millward (2005).
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cerns, controlled by SIP that later formed the basis for the constitution of 
the above mentioned IRI holding, Stet. In 1938, to spare Reiss Romoli the 
harsh measures against Jews adopted by the Fascist regime, the CEO of Ban-
ca Commerciale Italiana, Raffaele Mattioli (1895-1973) —one of  the most 
representative exponents of  IRI’s leadership group— sent him to the United 
States as head of  the New York branch of  the bank. Upon his return to Italy 
after the war, Reiss Romoli took over as Stet’s managing director, remaining 
in this role until 1961. Over a period of  fifteen years, he reconstructed and 
strengthened Italian telecommunications, blending innovation (Italy was one 
of  the first nations to activate direct dialing between urban centers) together 
with solid financial management. Under Reiss Romoli, Stet’s working capi-
tal grew by a factor of  ten as its investor base grew from 5000 to more than 
50,000 shareholders.
A well-known protagonist of  the “golden age” of  IRI was Fedele Cova 
(1904-1987), a man who fostered the expansion of  IRI in a totally new sec-
tor: concrete. Cova received a degree in industrial engineering after writing a 
thesis based on organic materials chemistry, especially cement and concrete. 
He began his professional career in various companies in this sector, eventu-
ally being appointed technical director of  Eternit in Genoa. He also added 
some important work experience abroad to his curriculum before being invit-
ed by Finsider in 1950 to become a consultant for the firm. Here he came to 
know the director, Ernesto Manuelli, and together the two devised the pro-
gram for a plant exploiting steel production residuals to produce cement. The 
project was very promising, since was in the throes of  the “Sinagaglia Plan” 
which brought about an expansive phase for steel production and Italy was 
in a phase of  intensive construction initiatives. It was Sinigaglia himself  who 
approved the project drafted by Cova and Manuelli: a new firm named Ce-
mentir was born and Cova was first appointed director and then CEO. He 
oversaw the construction of new plants, dealt with issues of funding, and took 
an active role in recruiting and training both technical personnel and manag-
ers for a sector that was new for IRI. 
But the project to which Cova’s name was most linked was that of  Ita-
ly’s tollroads. In 1956, IRI, as general contractor, was entrusted with the 
construction of  a network of  highways in Italy. Aldo Fascetti, president of 
IRI at the time, appointed Fedele Cova as the CEO of the newly formed com-
pany, Società Autostrade. As their first assignment, Cova and a group of  col-
laborators left for an extended stay in the United States where they would ac-
quire know-how as regards the most modern techniques for constructing as 
well as managing tollroads. In less than eight years (1957-1964), the 800 kil-
ometers of roadway linking Milan and Naples (Autostrada del Sole) were com-
pleted. It was a symbol of  what IRI could do for Italy’s economic growth and 
real unification. 
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Cova set up a large communications strategy to support the recourse to 
the capital market launched by Autostrade in order to cover the major part 
of  the new investments (only 36% was funded by the State). But, even though 
it achieved immediate success, Autostrade faced a series of  financial problems 
which it attempted to confront in the sixties by embarking on an even bigger 
project of highway construction. By the end of the decade, the company’s eco-
nomic situation had worsened because the commitments became excessive in 
relation to its management capabilities in a phase of  rising funding difficul-
ties, especially on the private capital market. 
TABLE 3 ▪ Financial resources - IRI group 1949-1973 (in%)
1949-55 1956-62 1963-73
State endowment funds 8.2 10.3 13.8
Private shareholders 9.2 12.6 2.5
Bonds 25.6 19.5 13.1
Special operations (ERP, et al.) 11.7 2.4 17.4
Medium and long term loans 23.3 33.9 32.8
Short term loans 17.5 15.9 20.0
Asset sales and other 4.5 5.4 0.4
Total (%) 100 100 100
Total billion euro (2012 prices) 14.5 26.2 81.5
Source: our analysis from Marsan data (1982).
Giuseppe Luraghi (1905-1991) linked his name to the Giulietta. With a 
degree in economics from Milan’s Bocconi University, for two decades he held 
various positions at Pirelli until, in 1952, he was appointed Managing Direc-
tor of  Finmeccanica where much of  his focus was on the auto manufacturer, 
Alfa Romeo. It was thanks to Luraghi that the Giulietta automobile model 
was born in 1955, the benchmark year of  mass motorization in Italy; this car 
would position Alfa Romeo among the pre-eminent auto manufacturers in 
Europe. But in 1956, amid harsh disagreements with IRI’s president, Aldo 
Fascetti, Luraghi quit the State group and accepted a position as President 
and CEO of  Lanerossi (textiles). Only four years later did he return to IRI 
when he was appointed president of  Alfa Romeo. For Alfa Romeo, the six-
ties were characterized by the construction of  a plant in Arese (outside Mi-
lan) and, in 1966, plans were drafted for another plant in Pomigliano d’Arco 
(outside Naples) where a new model, the AlfaSud, was built. 
A truly multi-faceted individual, Luraghi was a talented manager deeply 
interested in culture: he promoted the publication of  the review “Civiltà delle 
machine” (Civilization of machines) where poets, writers, and researchers por-
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trayed factory life —from warehouses to machinery— in all its forms. Luraghi’s 
story illustrated a rather original career path: with his fertile passage in and 
out of the public sector and the world of private entrepreneurship, he revealed 
himself  to be an authentic manager. But, as we will see in the next section, 
the choices made by Luraghi in the 1970s highlight how IRI’s governance was 
changing, with the headquarters having a stronger say in the controlled firms, 
while IRI’s top management were faced with increasing difficulties to respond 
to growing political and social constraints.
The turning point of the late 1950s
In the second half  of  the 1950s, the “benign neglect” that had charac-
terized De Gasperi’s centrist government (1947-1954) attitude came to an 
end. The economical, political and social role of  IRI underwent a deep 
change, which came about in four main steps, whose concatenation was cru-
cial: in 1956 there was the creation of  the Ministry of  State Shareholdings 
and the appointment of  a new top management of  IRI that transformed the 
governance of  the Group. The following year, IRI firms left Confindustria 
(the confederation representing Italian private firms), a significant event that 
opened the way for the problematical pursuit of  new labor relations in SOEs. 
More importantly, in 1957, Parliament approved Law n.634, which required 
that a major portion of  IRI investments (60% of new investments and 40% 
of all projects) be located in Southern Italy (Mezzogiorno). 
It was a very severe constraint for industrial strategies, but it was agreed 
to by IRI management, mainly because of the deep “patriotic feeling” we have 
already talked about. Their vision of  national interests —together with the 
inspiration of  Catholic solidarism shared by many of  them— firmed up into 
a growing focus on the Southern regions of  Italy. SOEs could represent the 
most adequate tool to work out a solution to the grave problems of  the gap 
between North and South that had historically characterized the country and 
which appeared to have worsened in the postwar reconstruction period. In-
spired by the strategic planner and ideologue of IRI Pasquale Saraceno (1903-
1991), the movement to develop Italy’s Mezzogiorno became a priority shared 
by IRI managers at the time, transcending political and philosophical lines, 
leading most of  them to consent the transformation of IRI into an agency for 
Italy’s economic development.
From the point of view of the political majority, a mix of reforming ideals 
and political calculations formed the basis for the turning point of the late 1950s. 
The new Ministry was created in order to establish a stronger control over State 
shareholdings. Since the end of  the war, in fact, in various political milieux 
—especially in the leftist segments of  the Christian Democrat party— strong 
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criticism had emerged about the excessive independence of  IRI management. 
In 1954, these sections formed the majority in the party and had pushed to 
reform IRI and to use it as a more active instrument for State intervention in 
promoting economic development. Their leader, Amintore Fanfani, new Sec-
retary General of  the Christian Democrat Party, found himself  facing a sig-
nificant defeat in the elections of  1953, in which the DC had lost 10% of its 
seats. As a hot-tempered economic historian, he considered that IRI could be 
a tool to implement industrial plans and important reforms, especially in the 
South, thus increasing political consensus. At the same time, control on State 
enterprise could strengthen the Christian Democrat party vis-à-vis of  its big-
gest competitor, the Communist Party, and also of  big private entrepreneurs 
and of  the most conservative wings of  the Catholic Church31. 
The new Ministry, though not terribly influential, symbolized the politi-
cians’ desire for control. Slowly but surely, a “silent political” partner appeared 
in the management of  IRI32. Even if  it may seem a bit paradoxical, IRI suf-
fered less interference (with the exception of  some major choices) in times of 
dictatorship, when there was no political competition. But after the war things 
had slowly changed, in the presence of  a partial competition (the so-called 
“blocked democracy”), when the political parties started to understand how 
the complex network of State owned firms could be used as a political weapon. 
Competition between various members of  the government alliance was ram-
pant: politicians would attempt to secure as many positions in State owned en-
terprises as possible on the basis of  their weight (as well as veto power) in the 
coalition. In this prospective, the system of state shareholdings had to grow as 
much as possible, regardless of the economic outcome. The shortage of finan-
cial resources —especially the ones offered by private investors— that the firms 
of  IRI faced in the second half  of  the sixties and even more in the seventies33 
meant that they were in great need of  help from the government as well as the 
Parliament, both of  which were controlled by political parties. Thereby IRI’s 
management slipped into ever stronger “dangerous liaisons” with the political 
system: a corporatist relationship whose ingredients were “mutual protection 
of interests, closeted relationships and mutually beneficial bartering”34. As we 
will see, for IRI management, this relationship generated a confusion of goals 
and growing difficulties in combining the dual and controversial obligations of 
public interest and efficient economic achievement35. 
This was a phase in which political contiguity started to become an im-
portant factor in appointments for State owned firms. In 1956, for example, 
31. Malgeri (2002).
32. Segreto (1999); Scoppola (1995), pp. 71-75.
33. Marsan (1982) in IRI Historical Archives, pp. 351-356.
34. Cox, O’Sullivan (1988), p. 137. 
35. Vernon, Aharoni (1981); Aharoni (1986); Maraffi (1990).
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Salvino Sernesi (1898-1964) was named General Manager of IRI. Sernesi had 
been a military official during World War I and then, with his training as an 
accountant, in the thirties acted as a consultant for the Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro, in the liquidation and merger office, after which he served as a man-
ager of  the institution’s Spanish branches. It was the BNL’s new president, 
Imbriani Longo, special Commissioner at IRI for a brief  but crucial period 
between July 1947 and February 1948, who appointed Sernesi to the role of 
Managing Director (1947-1954) of  the nation’s new television network, RAI. 
Sernesi had close ties to the Catholic Church: he was a high-ranking member 
of UCID, the association of Catholic executives. Sernesi oversaw the reorgan-
ization of IRI as well as its ties with the financial holdings and controlled firms: 
he established a structure of coordination for the Group and strengthened the 
office of  the internal audits, with the aim of  compensating the results of 
the most problematic areas of  the conglomerate with the most dynamic ones. 
He was especially involved in the new infrastructural investments in air trans-
portation (Alitalia) as well as in the merger of  the companies operating in the 
telephone sector, bringing about a centralization of  services. 
The ability of  politics to influence corporate leadership can be seen in the 
long presidency of  Giuseppe Petrilli (1913-1999), at the helm of IRI for al-
most two decades — from 1960 until 1979. A staunch European federalist, a 
scholar of  social statistics, Petrilli was not a man rooted in the business but 
a “politician” connected to Amintore Fanfani who insisted on his appoint-
ment as head of  IRI. During his term, the President set up a spoils system 
and closer centralized control on the group, while the concern entered a com-
pletely new phase. He established a governance model that was definitely more 
cohesive than in the past, with the headquarters playing a stronger role in the 
mediation with the political world and in the difficult task of  finding finan-
cial resources. 
Emblematic of  this change was the story of  AlfaSud. As mentioned ear-
lier, in 1966, Giuseppe Luraghi started the operation of  a new plant in south-
ern Italy (Pomigliano d’Arco, near Naples) as a strategic decision for the auto 
manufacturer. But in 1973, Petrilli (as president of  IRI) made an attempt to 
force the adoption of  a new program that completely negated the original 
strategic choice. The new program called for the transfer of  the assembly of 
seventy thousand vehicles from the plant at Pomigliano d’Arco to another in 
the nearby town of Avellino with the clear intention of redistributing employ-
ment in the South in response to political pressures received from the Chris-
tian Democrat leaders of  the Campania region. Luraghi was opposed to this 
new program and opted to resign. Even today the name of  the Pomigliano 
d’Arco plant evokes very difficult industrial relations. 
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The controversial theory of “economicità”
In the late sixties, overwhelming new tasks were assigned to IRI firms, in 
order to support production and employment dynamics, particularly in the 
South. The strong revenues registered by some IRI firms in previous years and 
their ability to promote technological and organizational innovations allowed 
for the planning of  expansive and ambitious projects. The macro-economic 
purpose of State intervention in Mezzogiorno was partly achieved in its quan-
titative dimension: in the fifties and sixties, the ratio between GDP per capita 
in the southern regions and national GDP per capita grew visibly and, for the 
first time since unification (1861), the gap between the income of the Center-
North and the South was reduced. 
The leaders of  IRI became more and more aware of  the role played by 
their concerns in the controversial but undeniable process of  economic and 
social modernization of the nation. The data of total assets of the Group (that 
in 1936 had represented 9.3% of the total assets of  all Italian manufacturing 
companies; in 1952, 11,5%; and in 1960, 9%) confirmed the capacity of  IRI 
to maintain its weight and its relevance over time, together with the expansion 
of  the Italian economy36. This role was summarized by the slogan of  a cam-
paign of communication promoted in those years: “IRI: a formula for progress”. 
The robust positions held in almost all sectors, the remarkable achievements 
in the field of  transport and telecommunication infrastructures, the control 
of  innovative media such as television, the design and manufacture of  suc-
cessful products, are all factors that aroused in IRI management very positive 
expectations —sometimes exaggerated euphoria— about the future of  their 
businesses. However, the economic substance of  Group and the proud iden-
tity of  its leadership could not hide the contradictions of  those years. 
These were probably best represented by Saraceno’s attempts to produce 
a special theory for running SOEs37. He maintained that the only appropriate 
choice for a company belonged to IRI was “economicità’” (economic fitness). 
Emphasis was to be placed not on maximizing profits, but rather on concen-
trating on economic goals established within a framework of social and politi-
cal constraints. The results of these kinds of constraints were to be considered 
“improper financial burdens” for which Parliament would have to compen-
sate with indemnities from a specially created fund. For Saraceno, the system 
of  State shareholdings needed to be managed in a continuous and positive 
confrontation between political goals and public entrepreneurship. In fact, 
until the mid-sixties, it is possible to affirm that IRI was operated in this man-
36. Toninelli, Vasta (2010), pp. 70-75.
37. Saraceno, La posizione sul mercato dell’impresa pubblica, dattiloscritto del 16 giugno 
1965, in IRI Historical Archives, SD/1789.
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ner, so much so that the “IRI Formula” was studied and copied by advanced 
nations such as Sweden and Great Britain38. 
Saraceno’s intellectual elaboration was fascinating: it was an ambitious 
project, able to overcome the long-standing divide between public and private, 
between economics and politics. IRI was a firm that went beyond the firm. 
But in 1970s, all of  this could not stand up to a comparison with reality. 
The objectives for industrial development and social stability taken on by 
IRI firms beginning with the postwar reconstruction and actively promoted 
during the era of  Italy’s “economic miracle” had become excessively all-en-
compassing. 
This can be seen with brutal clarity in Finsider’s progressive and dramat-
ic accumulation of  debt; the holding had been driven to enact strategies that 
exceeded its management capabilities, both in financial terms and in main-
taining its position on the national and international markets. Finsider had 
also taken over the problematic steel operations of  Fiat. Another IRI con-
cern, Fincantieri, was in a similar situation. Created in 1959 as a spin-off  of 
Finmeccanica, by the late sixties it was forced to take over the private Piag-
gio shipyards that were in dire straits. Further proof was the failed AlfaSud 
project which was burdened, as already described, under the weight of  noble 
requests for favoring growth in the South and by less noble requests from the 
political forces. In a similar way, there was little economic sense in creating a 
fifth steel center in the Calabrian town of  Gioia Tauro. Plans for the plant 
were made late and exclusively for political and social reasons, since local pol-
iticians had protested that their region had been forgotten by the State and 
violent riots spread across 1970-1971. 
The downward parabola of  the public steel sector —pursued in the sixties 
and seventies by Mario Marchesi and Alberto Capanna— is probably the most 
emblematic. Marchesi (1904-1988) was an engineer trained in the tradition of 
Agostino Rocca’s school of  productive rationalization; in the postwar period 
he was a key figure in Finsider’s technical staff  and actively involved in the 
realization of  the Sinigaglia Plan. He was also one of  the authors behind 
the success of  the Cornigliano steel mill, an entirely new plant which tripled 
its sales and profits in just a few years thanks to a productive structure based on 
the American model, not only from the way products were made, but also 
from the organization of  the plant with its precise division of  tasks, the crea-
tion of  a form of collaboration between line and staff, and the groundbreak-
ing introduction of  job evaluation, which signaled a new way of  controlling 
human resources. 
Marchesi was also one of  the managers who was most convinced by the 
project of  constructing a new factory in Taranto for manufacturing integrat-
38. Beesley, White (1973); Tomlinson (1999).
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ed cycle steel. The plant was intended as Italy’s fourth “pole” for steel and, 
based in the Southern part of  the nation, became a fundamental component 
for the region’s industrial development. But the attempt to rationalize the en-
tire public sector of  steel manufacture inspired by the “Cornigliano model” 
failed. Its failure can be attributed to various causes: difficult industrial rela-
tions, internal divergences within IRI ranks, and growing pressure to answer 
to political demands that over time would distort the objectives of  State in-
dustry. 
Marchesi shared an “expansionary” vision of  the public steel sector to-
gether with Alberto Capanna, a member of  the new generation of  IRI man-
agement. Capanna (1910-1995) had been a member of IRI’s office of research 
studies when it was headed by Pasquale Saraceno, and later worked under Si-
nagaglia’s guidance, dedicating himself  to the study of the steel industry with-
in the new European context. As Vice-Director of Finsider from 1960, he pur-
sued the Japanese model, based on plants of  huge capacity. In 1967 he was 
also among the most vocal proponents for doubling the size of  the steel cent-
er in Taranto, underestimating the difficulties of industrial relations in an area 
that only a few years earlier had been completely extraneous to the phenom-
enon of the giant factory. Taranto 2 was an enormous plant that was designed 
in 1969 —at the height of  the nation’s politically tense “Hot Autumn”— and 
it started production in 1975, when the crisis of  Italian industrial relations 
was far from being resolved. 
Summing up
The biographical profiles help to outline a scenario embracing continui-
ties and turning points in cultures and strategies of  the leadership group of 
IRI from its origins to the seventies. These elements mark both the story of 
a major industrial group and the path of  the reformer project assigned by the 
government to the SOE: since its relaunch in the early post-war years, in fact, 
IRI and its companies had to achieve the goals of  economic development and 
social modernization. But, over time, the extension of  those goals underwent 
crucial changes. According to the executive group who led the Institute in the 
early fifties, the social goals on the agenda —both the struggle against mas-
sive unemployment and the strong North-South regional disparities— had to 
be pursued by creating wealth through competitiveness and in accordance 
with criteria of  healthy management. They did not exclude actions to support 
key sectors in difficulty (as in the case of  engineering), but those interven-
tions were regarded as complementary and should not affect the budgetary 
balance of  the Group. At that time, the years of  De Gasperi’s government 
(1947-1954), the majority party gave broad economic responsibilities to IRI 
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technocracy, assuming the role of  political mediation to reconcile innovation 
and stability. 
This vision, already tarnished in the late fifties, changed in the following 
decade, when there were a remarkable growth of  IRI and a transformation of 
the political context with the launch of  the “planning” period. Gradually the 
“philosophy” was no longer the same: just the excellent financial results achieved 
by several IRI companies justified the rise of  initiatives disregarding budget-
ary constraints, while the influence of  politicians in the management of  IRI 
became more and more intrusive.
At the end of  the sixties, the internal and external factors that had sup-
ported the growth (particularly in terms of  cost and productivity of  labor) 
ended. The economic slowdown made it more difficult for IRI managers to 
carry out healthy management vis-à-vis the wider and wider political and so-
cial tasks assigned to their firms. Non-economic tasks were increasingly de-
manded of  IRI companies, which were expected to pursue Saraceno’s ob-
jectives of  “economic fitness” (economicità), a blended concept of  profit and 
social and political satisfaction.
The crisis of  the seventies set off  contradictions and made the search for 
equilibrium even more difficult. The rise of  oil prices and wages together with 
the collapse of  the Bretton Woods monetary system, hit the whole of  Italian 
big business; but the fate of  IRI was even more arduous, particularly in fac-
ing the hard climate of industrial relations. On the one hand, the political class, 
unable to guide the deep social transformations of  the country, pushed IRI 
to increase its involvement in the realization of  counter-cyclical policies. On 
the other hand, IRI managers —arguably encouraged by leading role conquered 
in the national production system during the sixties— did not seem to grasp 
the scale of  the crisis and carried on plans and strategies in contrast with mar-
ket trends.
It was the beginning of  the IRI crisis and the failure of  the reformer de-
velopmental project entrusted to it.... 
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ABSTRACT
Taking advantage of  the archives of  IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale - Insti-
tute for Industrial Reconstruction), this article aims to look into the history of  the State su-
per-holding during a very significant period —1933-1970—. The entire venture of  IRI can be 
analyzed through the biographical profiles of  the most important managers of  the super-hold-
ing, its holdings and the most relevant companies, starting with its creator Alberto Beneduce. He 
was the inventor of  the “IRI formula” that combined state ownership with private sharehold-
ings, even if  in a minority position, and practiced a private managerial and entrepreneurial 
style. The next step is to look at the men forming the Italian “technocracy” of the thirties. Some 
of those men turned into the “Schumpeterian heroes” of  the years defined as the “Economic 
Miracle”. The next generation knew more difficult times. These managers tried to put together 
profit and social goals. It was too much and signaled the beginning of  the end of  IRI.
KEYWORDS: public enterprises, public-private enterprises; micro-business history: Europe: 
1913-; government, war, law, international relations, and regulation.
JEL CODES: L32, N84, N44
■
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ABSTRACT
Este artículo, aprovechando los archivos del IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale 
- Instituto para la Reconstrucción Industrial), pretende analizar la historia del citado super-
holding de titularidad pública durante un periodo muy significativo—- 1933-1970—. La tota-
lidad de la trayectoria del IRI puede ser analizada a través de los perfiles biográficos de los 
más importantes directores del super-holding, de sus filiales y más relevantes compañías, em-
pezando por su creador Alberto Beneduce. El fue el ‘inventor’ de la ‘fórmula del IRI’ que con-
jugaba propiedad estatal con accionistas privados, incluso en una posición minoritaria, y prac-
ticaba una gestión similar a la de empresa privada. El siguiente paso es analizar los hombres 
que formaron la ‘tecnocracia’ de la década de 1930. Algunos de ellos se convirtieron en autén-
tico ‘héroes’ Schumpterianos de los años del ‘Milagro Económico’. La siguiente generación 
conoció momentos más difíciles. Estos gestores intentaron combinar beneficios y objetivos so-
ciales. Era demasiado, señalando, de este modo, el principio del fin del IRI.
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